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Politics and charity
Juliet Chevalier-Watts, the University of Waikato
asks whether the water is getting clearer or muddier
T
his article considers the turbulent relationship of
charities and politics and debates whether there is a
judicial move towards creating a more harmonious
relationship between the two objects. The issues are consid-
ered in light of the Charities Act 2006 (England and Wales)
and the recent publication by the Charity Commission for
England andWales of guidance on campaigning and political
activity by charities. The article suggests that there is scant
authority for the current approach of the common law and
that clear guidance is necessary. The article concludes that
although the intentions of the Charity Commission may be
honourable, the results are inconclusive, and are unlikely to
clarify many of the issues.
THE DEFINITION OF CHARITY
The starting point for any foray into charity is the Statute of
Elizabeth I, 43 Eliz I c4 1601 known as the Charitable Uses
Act 1601. The preamble to the Act provides certain purposes
that are considered charitable, including inter alia, the relief
of the poor; the aged; the impotent; the maintenance of sick
andmaimed soldiers andmariners; and scholarly activities. It
is these purposes that provide the basis for the modern law of
charities. The purposes set out in the preamble, however, are
not definitive, and other purposes may be construed as being
charitable, as noted inMorice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 9
Ves 399 at 405.
The body of the Act has long since been repealed, but
Morgan in The Spirit of Charity (Professional Lecture, Shef-
field Hallam University, 3 April 2008) at 3.10 to 3.11 notes
that the preamble has remained and has been interpreted by
the courts and the Charity Commission as to what may be
deemed charitable. LordMacNaghten, in the seminal case of
Commissioners for the Special Purposes of the Income Tax v
Pemsel (1891) AC 531, set out the four heads of charity into
which all charitable trusts must fall, which are as follows:
• relief of poverty;
• advancement of education;
• advancement of religion; and
• other purposes beneficial to the community not falling
under any of the preceeding heads.
Richardson in Neville’s Law of Trusts (2004) 9th ed, p 119
notes that an object may fall within one of the heads, but that
does not mean that it will qualify automatically as a charity,
the law still requires the object to satisfy further tests. These
are: that the trust is for public purpose; that the trust is for the
benefit of the public; and that the trust is capable of being
controlled by the court, if necessary.
The enactment of the Charities Act 2006 in England and
Wales brought with it a number of developments to the law
of charity. The tests of charitable purpose and public benefit
remain, as per ss 2 and 3, but have been defined in a different
way. The new Act, in s 2, has increased the number of heads
that were first set out in Pemsel from four to thirteen, and
such purposes now explicitly include, inter alia, in addition
to the original three heads in Pemsel:
• the advancement of health or the saving of lives;
• the advancement of amateur sport;
• the advancement of animal welfare.
This may look like a large increase, but in reality, however, it
does not represent a substantive change as many of the new
heads would have been accepted under the fourth head of
Pemsel’s case, that of “trusts for other purposes beneficial to
the community not falling under any of the preceeding heads”.
The public benefit test has also been modified by the new
Act. Prior to the Act, the majority of charitable trusts were
presumed to be for the benefit of the public, unless proven
otherwise, however, s 3 of the Charities Act 2006 now
stipulates that “it is not to be presumed that a purpose of a
particular description is for the public benefit” and all chari-
ties must explicitly determine how they benefit the public.
One aspect of charity law that has not changed with the
implementation of the new Act is that a trust will not be
charitable if its purposes are political. However, the Charity
Commission in Speaking Out: Guidance on Campaigning
and Political Activity by Charities (CC9)March 2008, Fore-
word, noted that this principle has caused “considerable
debate” by academics and the judiciary when considering the
relationship between charities and politics. Fundamentally, a
charity must be established for a charitable purpose and in
order to do so, it may undertake campaigning and political
activity in order to achieve that objective, or to support its
purposes. However, the decisions in Bowman v Secular Soci-
ety Ltd [1917] AC 406 and National Anti-Vivisection Soci-
ety v IRC [1948] AC31 reflect that charities are not permitted
to undertake political activity. Such a definition has led to
authors, including DeHavilland in “Should Charities Have
Greater Freedom to Engage in Campaigning and Political
Lobbying” inNational Council for Voluntary Organisations
(2007)www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/press/speeches/index.asp?id=7216,
demanding clarity as to what constitutes campaigning with
political purpose as it is asserted that charities “currently
operate in a minefield of confusion”.
A HISTORY OF POLITICS IN CHARITIES?
Dunn notes in “Demanding Services or Servicing Demand?
Charities, Regulation and the Policy Process” in (2008) 71
MLR 247 that charities and politics have, from the outset,
had a symbiotic relationshipwhere charities were born out of
“an overtly political climate”. Dunn comments at 252 that
the 1601 Statute was thought to have been enacted to sup-
press social and political crises, and further, charities them-
selves began to form the backbone of a philanthropic era
New Zealand Law Journal March 2009 53
CHARITIES
Copyright of the New Zealand Law Journal  is the property of LexisNexis NZ Ltd and its content may not be copied, saved or emailed to multiple sites 




where state welfare had yet to make inroads, thereby making
charitable acts “political substitutes”. The strong influence
of politics on charitable purposes from the outset is clear to
see: education, relief of poverty, public health and the sup-
port of religion are all linked to political priorities, and little
has changed over the decades since the enactment of the 1601
Statute. Certainly the extended charitable purposes set out in
s 2 of the 2006 Act reflect the interplay between political
interests and charity. Dunn, at 252, notes that the purposes
“have a distinct public policy theme, extending from urban
and rural regeneration … to relief of employment … and the
promotion of human rights”. The latter clearly reflects the
link between political priorities and charitable purposes, as
the enactment of the (UK)Human Rights Act 1998 implicitly
furthered the objectives of the charitable organisationAmnesty
International, including, inter alia, mandating the right to
life, the prohibition of torture, and the right to liberty and
security.
Regardless, however, of the implicit affiliation between
charity and politics, it is a long-standing principle that a
voluntary organisation that wishes to acquire or retain chari-
table status must avoid having political purposes and to
avoid engaging in most forms of political activity. This stems
principally from one dictum, that of Lord Parker in Bowman
at 442:
a trust for the attainment of political object has always
been held invalid, not because it is illegal, but for everyone
is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a
change in the law, but because the Court has no means of
judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will
not be for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that
gift to secure the change is a charitable gift.
Gousmett, in “Charities and Political Activity” in [2007]
NZLJ 63, comments that Lord Parker established that it is
not for the courts to determine whether a public benefit
“would eventuate from a political activit[y]”. This principle
was affirmed inMcGovern v Attorney General [1982] 1 Ch
321, which further influenced the common law approach to
charities and politics. This case determined the legal status of
Amnesty International which proposed to set up a charitable
trust. Amnesty International declared that the purpose of the
trust was:
• looking after the needy, eg prisoners etc;
• promoting the abolition of capital and corporal pun-
ishment;
• researching and disseminating information on human
rights;
• securing the release of political prisoners.
Slade J held that purposes 1 and 3 could be charitable,
however, 2 and 4 were political. Slade J, at 509, determined
further that the following matters could be construed as
political purposes:
• furthering the interests of a particular political party;
• procuring changes in the laws of this country;
• bringing about changes in the laws of a foreign coun-
try;
• bringing about a reversal of government policy or of
particular decisions of governmental authorities, in
this country;
• bringing about a reversal of government policy or of
particular decisions of governmental authorities in a
foreign county.
Slade J’s opinion was adopted in Re Collier [1998] 1 NZLR
81.Mrs Collier wished to set up a charitable trust to promote
world peace. This would be by means of a telegram being
sent to the United Nations urging soldiers to lay down their
arms. Richardson noted that this was “overtly political and
so failed”. However, such approaches are not without criti-
cism.
Lord Porter commented, in his dissenting judgment in the
case of National Anti-Vivisection that (at 54) “it is curious
how scanty the authority is for the proposition that political
objects are not charitable”. In Public Trustee v Attorney
General [1997] 42 NSWLR 600 at 621, Santow J added to
the debate by noting that “persuasion directed to political
change is part and parcel of a democratic society in which
ideas and agendas compete for attention and allegiance”.
This echoes the considerations that charity was born out of
the needs of politics, and if this is so, thenDal Pont inCharity
Law in Australia and New Zealand (2000) p 212, may be
correct in his suggestion that it is not unreasonable that the
principle in the case of Bowman is “fraying around its edges,
and perhaps even in substance”.
Nonetheless, there are arguments for denying charitable
status to bodies engaged in political activity. Charities do not
submit themselves to the scrutiny of the democratic electoral
system, and as such, are not publicly accountable.O’Halloran,
in Charity Law and Social Inclusion, an International Study
(2007) 126, notes therefore that any political activity that a
charity might undertake could be construed as undermining
the “established democratic process”. Further, political cam-
paigns can garner and lose support, which would impact on
the requirement of public benefit, a crucial element in estab-
lishing charitable status, therefore to disassociate a group
from political purposes would be a benefit for a body trying
to attain charitable status.
CURRENT ISSUES
However, DeHavilland notes that there are uncertain demar-
cations between those bodies that may be seen as being too
politically active to be able to attain charitable status, and
those who campaign with a political purpose but it is not
fatal to their charitable purpose. O’Halloran, at 125, distin-
guishes between bodies with political purposes and bodies
that engage in political activities: the former are not chari-
table and the latter will be charitable if the activities are
ancillary and subordinate to its non-political activities and
purposes. Although this definition appears logical, it may not
be as straightforward as it first appears. Santow, in “Charity
in its Political Voice: a Tinkling Cymbal or Sounding Brass”
(1999) 52CLP 255, comments that charities that “proselytise
risk their charitable status” because current law suggests that
if an actual purpose, whether it central or otherwise, encour-
ages a change of government law or policy, either nationally
or internationally, then this will be fatal to its charitable
status, as it is considered to be against the public interest.
However, where the purpose is merely influential in changing
public opinion as opposed to direct pressure on governmen-
tal policy, then the position is not so clear.
Santowargues thatwhencharitiesadoptapolitical voice, it
mustbedonesocautiously,“asa tinklingcymbal,nota sound-
ing brass” as a charity cannot be certainwhether the judiciary
will consider even a conservative approach asmerely an ancil-
lary activity. DeHavilland supports this view, noting that it is
easy to know what the law says, but far more difficult is
knowing how to apply it to charitable activities. Indeed,
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DeHavilland further suggests that some charities may be pre-
vented from campaigning due to perceived political bias and
confusion as to what would constitute an ancillary purpose.
Dunn supports this concern, noting at 260, that charitieswith
political experience, andwith the resources and commitment,
maybeable tochallengetherestrictionseffectively,orevenjust
test the law, but for other charitieswithout such resources and
experience, thismay be too great a risk to take, as anyCharity
Commission inquiry may alienate support and thus under-
mine theorganisation’s status.
Dunn highlights further areas of concern, at 259: although
charities may not have political purposes as their main objec-
tive, theymayundertake political activities, including respond-
ing to consultations, presenting petitions and campaigning
for changes in policy or regulations, but only where those
activities are subsidiary to its main purpose and are presented
in amanner that is non-partisan andwith independence from
any political party. However, there is no clear demarcation as
to what constitutes subsidiary and what constitutes core
activity, either in regulatory frameworks or in the common
law. Nevertheless, Dunn argues at 259 that if there were clear
demarcations then this may only add to the issues, as the
regulatory rules would become inflexible and would not be
subject to interpretation, which is key when assessing poli-
cies in a variety of contexts.
Regardless of the lack of standardisation, the English
Charity Commission suggests in the Survey of Campaigning
Activities and Charity Commission Guidance (CC9), 2006,
that charities may be self-regulating on this matter and do so
by measuring the political activity boundary as no more than
one fifth of their overall activities. Dunn argues that such
self-regulation “leads to a degree of second guessing and
ultimate censorship of an organisation’s activities by trust-
ees” when it may not even be appropriate. If bodies do carry
out such self-regulation, then it is likely that a number of
such bodies will have failed to apply for charitable status due
to concerns thatmay, ormay not, be unsubstantiated, thereby
suggesting that the current regulatory framework supports
arbitrary discrimination.
Regardless of the issues associated with political activity
and its relation to charity, obtaining charitable status mat-
ters. Morgan notes at 4.2 to 4.6 that the significance of
attaining charitable status can be great. Such advantages
include tax benefits and the reputational benefit that can




paigning and the Voluntary Sector (2007) at 2.3 notes that in
the past the Charity Commission has interpreted court judg-
ments on political activities with some rigidity, but welcomes
their more contemporary flexible approach. Her Ladyship
also suggests that charity and politics are unequivocally
intertwined, and always have been, and proposes that Lord
Parker’s dicta in the case of Bowman “considerably over-
stated the position” with regard to the judiciary failing to
recognise political objects as being charitable. Indeed, it is
further suggested at 1.4.1 to 1.5.8 that the case of Bowman
incorrectly influenced the development of guidelines on politi-
cal activities and campaigning by charities, thus leading to
the case of McGovern’s strict reaffirmation of the common
law, and such a conservative approach led to an inhibiting set
of guidelines formulated by the Charity Commission. The
Advisory Group acknowledges the established legal justifica-
tion that charities cannot undertake political purposes because
the judicial system is not in a position to judge whether a
political purpose is for the public benefit due to the links with
the constitutional doctrine of the separationof powers between
the executive and the legislature, and as such, acknowledges
the proposal that the courts would be undermining the
sovereignty of Parliament if they were tomake a judgment on
changing the law or policy. However, her Ladyship, at 1.6.1
and 1.6.2, is unconvinced that the “public policy consider-
ations that underpin the restrictions on charities and cam-
paigning” are justified and indeed are contradictory.
Baroness Kennedy’s opinion echoes the considerations of
Hammond J in Re Collier at 89–90:
Is it really inappropriate for a judge to recognise an issue
as thoroughly worthy of public debate, even though the
outcome of that debate might be to lead to a change in the
law? After all, it is commonplace for judges to make
suggestions themselves for changes in the law today …
And we do … live in an age which enjoys the supposed
benefits of [freedom of thought, conscience, religion and
expression]. Should not the benefits be real in all respects,
including the law of charities?
The author concurs with such an approach, and submits that
if the court is able to make such a categorical decision in
decidingwhat is not in the public’s interest, as was decided by
the Court in National Anti-Vivisection Society, then there
can be little difference in deciding what is beneficial to the
community in the context of political objects. As Santow
rightly points out with regard to the National Anti-
Vivisection Society case, the Court “had no difficulty in
making such a judgment negatively – it held that the law
change sought was not in the public interest”. There is no
judicial comment on this particular approach, although Dal
Pont suggests at 213 that the courts should presume that the
current law represents that which is beneficial to the commu-
nity, which could be rebutted where appropriate.
Embracing just such an approach, as advocated by Dal
Pont, may already be receiving favour. The Sensible Sentenc-
ing Group Trust was incorporated as a charitable trust in
February 2002. It has as its aims:
1. That within New Zealand and for the benefit of both
the local and national communities, provide in respect
of sentencing for violent and serious criminal offences
education as to relevant issues, options for reforms and
the design and or drafting of appropriate mechanisms,
procedures, regulations and or law for consideration of
legislative adoption to help ensure all New Zealanders
are adequately insulated and protected from violent
and serious criminal offenders.
2. To do any act in furtherance of the charitable objects of
the Trust.
Gousmett states that it is clear that this charity has at its core
predominantly political agendas and activities, yet equally
so, any individual who wishes to be informed of issues
“relating to the sentencing of criminals for violent and seri-
ous offences would find the aims … to be unquestionably of
public benefit”. Here then is clear evidence that the Charity
Commission in New Zealand is able to determine an overtly
political organisation as being in the public’s interest. How-
ever, the author would argue that its very aims conflict with
the matters elucidated by Slade J in the Amnesty Interna-
tional case, thereby suggesting a weakening in the approach
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of the principles established in the case of Bowman. None-
theless, Gousmett notes that the Sensible Sentencing Trust
“may well be justified in its concerns regarding its future
ability to perform its charitable obligations” as the Charities
Commission was reported to have commented that they
would be investigating thoroughly any organisations that
appear to be set up predominantly to advocate social change,
and where this is not deemed to be charitable, then steps to
deregulate would be undertaken. This is an uncomfortable
notion, although in light of the current common lawapproach,
it is perhaps unsurprising. However, the UK appears to be
advocating a much more positive approach with regard to
harmonising the issue between politics and charities.
THE CHARITY COMMISSION (E&W)
TheCharityCommission forEnglandandWales has responded
to the considerable public debate about the complex relation-
ship between politics and charity, and in light of the 2006 Act
its new guidelines on campaigning and political activity by
charities, published inMarch 2008, attempt to simplify some
of the issues. The Commission, in its Foreword, is at pains to
comment however that the fundamentals of charity law on
campaigning and political activity have not changed, although
their latest guidance attempts to ensure its relevance in
contemporary times.
The Charity Commission recognises at C2 that some
charities have been overly cautious “and inclined to self
censor their campaigning activity”, and as a result the Com-
mission wants charities to be confident about what charities
are legitimately able to do under the constraints of the
legislative framework. The Commission states clearly that a
charity cannot have political activity as one of its charitable
purposes, therefore an organisation with a political purpose,
such as promoting a change in the law, cannot be a charity.
This will be so even if the organisation has other purposes
that are charitable. The Commission’s argument at D3 is that
it would involve the Commission or the court having to
consider political questions, which they are unable to do
constitutionally.
The author submits however that such decisions have
already been made, at least in the negative, as discussed
earlier in the case ofNational Anti-Vivisection Society, there-
fore if a decision is able to be made in the negative about
political activity, then surely it must be able to be made in the
positive? It appears that the Commission is unwilling to
contemplate such an approach, and it seems that it will only
construe political activity in the negative. However, this issue
is still not actually clarified in its entirety. The Commission
suggests at D3 that certain areas of political activity may not
automatically be fatal to charitable status, for instance, chari-
ties established for the advancement of human rights, clearly
bodies with political agendas, will not automatically be
presumed to be pertaining to political activity. Instead, the
Commission will explore with the said charities their bound-
aries and their overall purposes. The author suggests that this
is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, the Commission is
intimating that it is flexible in its approach and thus its
criteria are open to interpretation, but on the other hand, for
charities to submit themselves to such scrutiny when the
boundaries are unclear means they risk, at best being seen as
being scrutinised for their actions and so hazard losing
support, and at worst, they risk losing charitable status. I
submit that few bodies will have the means or the will to test
the guidelines, and if this is so, then self-regulation will still
remain, regardless of the intentions of the Commission.
Interestingly even though the Charity Commission was
quick to raise, and implicitly criticise, the concept of self-
regulation at C2, it would appear to be implicitly supported
by the Commission in its own guidance. The Commission
confirms its stance at F1 that trustees must not be “overly
cautious or risk averse” and yet the Commission is also keen
to indicate that trustees must equally need “to consider the
impact of the proposed campaign or political activity for the
charity’s reputation” as failing to do so will risk the charity’s
independence and reputation. Responsibility falls fully with
the trustees of the charity and as such, it is likely that until
such boundaries are tested to the full, a number of charities
will still feel compelled to act cautiously. However, the Com-
mission has attempted to reassure those bodies by noting at
H that “trustees who have considered this guidance, and
acted in good faith, should have few worries”. Unfortu-
nately, such vaguely-worded platitudeswill do little to restore
confidence to bodies that are already confused by the regu-
latory framework that is as yet untested and instead, the very
issue of overt self-censoring that the Commission has been
keen to extinguish will simply be implicitly supported.
CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that charities and politics share an intimate
past, but their relationship throughout the decades has been
turbulent and often contradictory. The law has tried to
distinguish between charities carrying out political activity
and having charitable purposes, in order to establish whether
a body may obtain, or retain its charitable status, however,
such attempts have not always been clear and have oftentimes
been subject to criticism. The new English Act has done little
to clarify these issues and DeHavilland would even go so far
as to say that it is “woefully inadequate”. As a result of such
criticism, the Charity Commission for England and Wales
published its most up-to-date guidance on campaigning and
political activity inMarch 2008. This was an opportunity for
the Commission to satisfy its critics and verify its require-
ments. Certainly, the guidance implies that it is fully under-
standing of the onerous burdens that are placed on trustees,
and that suggests that it is keen to quash overt self-regulation
on the part of charitable bodies. However, this article sug-
gests that regardless of the intentions of the Charity Com-
mission, the regulatory framework is still unclear and it is
unlikely that it will fully reassure trustees. Those charitable
institutions that have the funds, experience and resources to
test the framework will be able to do so, and may be
supported by the Commission for their intrepid stance, how-
ever, those organisations that do not have the funding or
support may still be prone to strict self-regulation rather than
risk submitting themselves to such scrutiny when potentially
they have so much to lose. Nonetheless, the article submits
that the Commission’s attempt to clarify the law, albeit not
without criticism, is a positive step, and one that may be
construed as promoting a more flexible approach towards
politics and charities, but until such times as the regulatory
frameworks are challenged and tested, it is likely that the
waters surrounding the subject of charities and their involve-
ment with politics will remain muddied. r
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